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Comments
THE BIRNBAUM DOCTRINE REVISITED:
STANDING TO SUE UNDER
RULE 10B-5 ANALYZED
It is now a well established principle of federal corporate common
law that an implied civil cause of action exists' under section 10 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 19342 [hereinafter referred to as the 1934 Act],
and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rule 10b-53 enacted thereunder. In essence, it is a 10b-5 violation for any person to use "in connection with the purchase or sale" of any security "any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance." 4 There has been much speculation as to
the breadth of rule 10b-5. At the extreme, it has been suggested that it is
unlawful "that someone 'do something bad'

.

.. in connection with a pur-

chase or sale of securities,"5 and that the buyer can sue the seller if the
price goes down; the seller can sue the buyer if the price goes up; and
1. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Gas. Co., 92 S. Ct. 165. 169 n.9

(1971). See also the major work in the area of rule lOb-5, A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES
LAw: FRuD §§ 2.4 (1)- (2), 8.1 (1971) [hereinafter cited as BROMBERG]. There has

been much debate as to the validity of the implied cause of action. Compare Ruder,

Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent? 57 Nw.
U.L. Ryv. 627 (1963), with Joseph, Civil Liability under Rule 10-5-A Reply, 59 Nw.
U.L. REv. 171 (1964). See also Ruder, Current Developments in the Federal Law
of Corporate Fiduciary Relations-Standing To Sue Under Rule 10-5, 26 Bus.

LAw. 1289 n.4 (1971).
2. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10 (b), 15 U.S.C. § 78 (j) (1970) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
for the protection of investors (emphasis added).

3. SEC rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1970) provides:

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails,
or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the pur-

chase or sale of any security (emphasis added).
4. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life &Gas. Co., 92 S. Ct. 165, 168 (1971).
5. Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 804 (5th Cir. 1970), citing R. JENNINGS
& H. MARSH,SECURrrIES REGULATION 961 (2d ed. 1968).
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either can sue the other for interest if the price stays the same.0 Rule 10b-5
is the most highly litigated 7 and chaotic8 area in corporate securities law
because of its potential scope and the advantages of bringing a cause of
action under the 1934 Act.9
Because of the great potential for litigation under rule 10b-5, courts
have searched for methods to limit its breadth.' 0 Judge Kaufman, in the
landmark case of Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.," enunciated the
limitation that only purchasers and sellers of securities have standing to
sue under rule 10b-5. Therefore, many possible claimants (i.e., nonselling
stockholders and prospective investors) have found the federal courthouse
door closed to them. Because the purchaser-seller limitation is the "only
substantial impediment" to recovery under 10b-5,1 2 a favorable determination on this threshold question is essential.
The purchaser-seller limitation, however, has been construed liberally
by most courts, 13 and, moreover, it is inapplicable when the remedy sought
is an injunction.' 4 Also, the SEC has argued as amicus curiae' 5 that the
purchaser-seller limitation is too narrow.1 6 This trend to expand the ambit
of protection under 10b-5 has been viewed as an "erosion" or the "demise"
of the Birnbaum Doctrine.1 7 Still, the courts generally have reaffirmed it.'8
In light of this controversy, it is the purpose of this comment to summarize
the current law of standing and, more importantly, to offer a framework
for an analysis of standing to sue under rule 10b-5.19
6. Marsh, What Lies 4head Under Rule 10b-5?, 24 Bus. LAw. 69 (1968).
7. BROMBERG § 2.5 (5), at 45.

8. Marsh, supra note 6, at 73.
9. BROMBERG § 4.7 (1). at 83. Once in federal court under rule lOb-5 certain
benefits may accrue (e.g., procedural advantages, application to broader classes of
persons, and easier standards of proof that are not available in an action brought
in state court.
10. See Bradford, Rule 10b-5: The Search For A Limiting Doctrine, 19 BUFF.

L. Rrv. 205 (1970). Some doctrines which have been used to limit the scope of
rule 1Ob-5 are privity, causation, reliance and foreseeability. Mutual Shares Corp.
v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 544 & n.9 (2d Cir. 1967); BROMBERG § 8.9, at 223.
11. 98 F. Supp. 506, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), af'd, 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
12. 1967 DUKE L. REV. 894, 895. See also De Lancey, Rule lOb-5-A Recent
Profile, 25 Bus. LAw. 1355, 1369 (1970).
13. See, e.g., Mader v. Armel, 402 F.2d 158 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 930 (1969); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
14. Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
15. For a general discussion of amicus curiae participation by the SEC, see
Cohen, The Development of Rule 10b-5, 23 Bus. LAw. 593, 597 (1968).
16. See, e.g., A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 397 n.3 (2d Cir.
1967); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 636 (2d Cir.), cert denied,
389 U.S. 970 (1967). See also Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417
F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969), cert denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970).
17. Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule
lOb-5, 54 VA. L. REV. 268 (1968). But see 6 L. Loss, SEcuasTIES REGULATION 3620
(Supp. 2d ed. 1969); referring to Lowenfels' article, the author states: "[T]he
word 'demise' in this context does nevertheless invoke memories of Mark Twain."
18. See, e.g., Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 797 (2d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
19. There have been numerous analyses of the Birnbaum Doctrine. Another
exhaustive treatment of the cases would be superfluous. Consequently, after a
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Before summarizing the current status of the Birnbaum Doctrine, it
is important to note that the purchaser-seller requirement and the fraud
20
requirement are two different prerequisites to a 10b-5 cause of action.
Only the purchaser-seller limitation goes to the question of standing.
Failure to understand this distinction will cause an inaccurate analysis of
2
the standing question. '
22
In Birnbaurn, Feldman sold his controlling stock in Newport Steel
at a premium .(twice its fair market value), instead of seizing a corporate
opportunity to merge with Follansbee Steel. Minority shareholders alleged
that Feldman had violated rule 10b-5 by failing to disclose the sale of
stock at a premium. The Second Circuit, through Judge Augustus N. Hand,
affirmed the dismissal of the cause of action based, among other things, on
the purchaser-seller limitation. 23 Judge Hand rationalized the purchaserseller limitation by stating that the SEC did not intend for all investors
to be protected by rule 10b-5:
Section 17 (a) of the 1933 Act only made it unlawful to defraud or
deceive purchasers of securities, and Section 15 (c) of the 1934
Act dealt only with fraudulent practices by security brokers or
dealers in over-the-counter markets. No prohibition existed against
fraud on a seller of securities by the purchaser if the latter was not
a broker or a dealer. Consequently, on May 21, 1942 the SEC
adopted Rule X-10B-5 to close this ".

.

. loophole in the protections

against fraud administered by the Commission by prohibiting individuals or companies from
buying securities if they engage in
24
fraud in their purchase."
summary of the important cases, this comment will concern itself with how to
determine standing more accurately. The following is a list of articles which treat
the issue of standing; since this is a constantly changing area, the articles are
listed in reverse chronological order: Boone & McGowan, Standing To Sue Under
SEC Rule lOb-5, 49 TEXAS L. REV 617 (1971); Painter, Rule 10b-5: The Recodifica.
tion Thicket, 45 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 699, 727-32 (1971); Ruder. Current Developments
in the Federal Law of Corporate Fiduciary Relations-Standing to Sue Under
Rule 10b-5, 26 Bus. LAW. 1289 (1971); De Lancey, Rule lOb-5-A Recent Profile,
25 Bus. LAW. 1355, 1369-70 (1970); Comment, Another Demise of the Birnbaum
Doctrine: "Tolls the Knell of Parting Day?", 25 U. MIAMI L. REV. 131 (1970);
Kellogg, The Inability to Obtain Analytical Precision Where Standing to Sue Under
Rule 10b-5 Is Involved, 20 BUFF. L. REV. 93 (1970); Lowenfels, The Demise of
the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule 10b-5, 54 VA. L. REv. 268 (1968);
Note, The Purchaser-SellerLimitation to SEC Rule 10b-5, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 684
(1968); Comment, The Purchaser-Seller Rule: An Archaic Tool for Determining
Standing Under Rule 10b-5, 56 GEo. L.J. 1177 (1968); 1967 DUKE L.J. 898; 1967
DUKE L.J. 894; Comment, Securities-Rule lOb-5-Purchaser-Sellerand Deception
Elements Held Not Strict Prerequisites to Liability in Civil Action Under SEC
Rule 10b-5, 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 978 (1967); Sommer, Rule 10b-5: Notes for Legislation, 17 WEsT REs. L. REV. 1029 (1966); Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control,
104 U. PA. L. Ri.v. 725, 832-35 (1956).
20. BROMBERG § 4.7 (3), at 88.1.
21. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life c Cas. Co., 300 F. Supp. 1083,
1096 nn.12 & 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), affd, 430 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1970), rev'd, 92 S.Ct.
165 (1971).
22. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
343 U.s. 956 (1952).
23. Id. at 464.
24. Id. at 463, quoting SEC Securities Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942).
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A second ground for dismissal was that the alleged fraud, i.e., corporate
mismanagement, was not cognizable under rule 10b-5. 25 It has been suggested that the court overreacted to the presence of corporate mismanagement, and thus accepted the purchaser-seller limitation as further assurance
against expansion of federal corporate law,2 6 because traditionally, state
court was the proper place to seek relief from corporate mismanagement. 27
In practice, the apparently simple task of identifying who is a "purchaser" or "seller" within the meaning of section 10 of the 1934 Act and
rule 10b-5 is difficult. As will be seen, the common law definition of "purchaser" and "seller" is not sufficient for this task 2s because of the broader
statutory definition of "purchase" and "sale" in the 1934 Act, 29 and the
subsequent liberal interpretations of the terms, based on the Act's policy
to protect investors, which have resulted. The discussion that follows illustrates the expansive way in which "purchase" and "sell" have been
defined.
The issuance of corporate securities was held to be a "sale" in Hooper
v. Mountain States Securities Corp.30 Consequently, the issuing corporation
was a "seller" with standing to sue under rule 10b-5. Thus, it follows that
nonselling or nonpurchasing shareholders have standing to bring a shareholder's derivative action on behalf of a "seller" (or "purchaser" in an
appropriate case) corporation. 3 '
The Supreme Court, in SEC v. National Securities, Inc.,.3 2 held the exchange of securities to effect a merger constituted a "purchase" of securities.
There, shareholders who approved the merger on the basis of material
misrepresentations in the proxy statements were "purchasers" when they
exchanged their securities for the new company's securities. In Dasho v.
Susquehanna Corp.,33 the surviving corporation was a "purchaser" and
"seller" when it exchanged its securities for assets, including stock, of the
disappearing corporation, thus effecting a merger. The same result occurs
when a sale of assets for securities is followed by a corporate liquidation.3 4
In Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co.,33 the plaintiff was characterized as
25. Id. at 464.
26. Leech, Transactions In Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 725, 834
(1956).
27. See, e.g., Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349
U.S. 952 (1955), on remand, 154 F. Supp. 436 (D. Conn. 1957). After the dismissal
of Birnbaum was affirmed, the minority shareholders of Newport Steel brought
this derivative action (based on Indiana law) for Feldmann's breach of his fiduciary
obligation to the corporation. The plaintiffs were successful in recovering the
control premium Feldmann received.
28. See, e.g., Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 806-07 (5th Cir. 1970).
29. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 3 (13)- (14), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 (c) (13)- (14)
(1970) provides:
(13) The terms "buy" and "purchase" each include any contract to buy,
purchase, or otherwise acquire.
(14) The terms "sale" and "sell" each include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of.
30. 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
BROMBERO § 4.7 (3), at 88.2.
32. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).

31.

33. 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 589 U.S. 977 (1967).
34. See Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., 415 F.2d 1326 (7th Cir. 1969).
35. 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol37/iss3/4
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a seller so as to satisfy the Birnbaum rule even though no actual purchase or
sale ever took place. A short form merger left the plaintiff holding worthless securities. Because his only alternative was to exercise his appraisal
right, he was called a "forced seller" by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and was given standing to sue before actually exercising his option.3 6
In 1969, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided two cases which
illustrate both that court's allegiance to Birnbaum and the expansion of
Birnbaum. Both cases involved tender offers which were fraudulently
thwarted by the management of the target corporations. In the first case,
Iroquois Industries,Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp.,37 the tender offeror was
held not to have standing to sue because none of the target corporation's
stock was ever purchased, 38 even though the defendants' fraud induced the
offerees not to sell. The second case, Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake
Co.,39 involved a similar situation except that the defendants also threatened
the plaintiff with an anti-trust suit if it did not divest itself of Air Brake
stock which had been acquired prior and incidental to the tender offer.
Succumbing to the threat, plaintiff did sell the stock (at a profit) and, as
a result of this "forced sale," was given standing to sue.40 For the court to
have been true to the Birnbaum Doctrine, Crane, like Iroquois, should
have been dismissed because Crane's "forced sale" bore no relationship to
the scheme which thwarted the tender offer.41
A number of standing rules have been developed in cases involving
broker-dealers and their clients. Broker-dealers have standing to sue their
nonpurchasing clients who, before ordering, plan not to consummate the
purchase if the price of the securities falls. 42 Under these circumstances the
broker-dealer is characterized as a "purchaser," 43 based on the fact that a
contract for the sale of securities is a "sale" within the meaning of the 1934
Act.4 4 On the other hand, clients can sue broker-dealers who sell them nonexistent securities because they would have been actual purchasers of securities in a valid transaction. 4 5 This is another example of the nonpurchasing investor being characterized as a "purchaser" under rule 10b-5.4 6
Clients were also allowed to sue their broker in Stockwell v. Reynolds &
Co.,47 even though the clients did not sell immediately after the alleged
fraud. A later sale of securities satisfied the Birnbaum Doctrine because the
broker's fraud had induced the plaintiffs to defer sale.
36.
37.
38.
89.
40.
41.

Id. at 634-35.
417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970).
Id. at 970.
419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
Id. at 798.
Kellogg, The Inability to Obtain Analytical Precision Where Standing To

Sue Under Rule 10b-5 Is Involved, 20 BuFF. L. Rxv. 93, 101

(1970). But see

Boone &McGowan, Standing To Sue Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 49 TExAs L. REv. 617,
629 (1971).
42. A.T. Brod &cCo. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967).
43. Id. at 397 & n.3.
44. Cf. Commerce Reporting Co. v. Puretec, Inc., 290 F. Supp 715, 719
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
45. Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
46. Id. at 444.

47. 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Cf. Opper v. Hancock Sec. Corp., 250
F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 367 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1972
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In contrast to the above cases, which expanded the Birnbaum Doctrine by broadly interpreting the terms "purchase" and "sale," Mutual
Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc. 48 created a true exception to the Birnbaum
Doctrine. This exception is that no purchase or sale is required for those
seeking injunctive relief under rule 10b-5:
[W]e do not regard the fact plaintiffs have not sold their stock as
controlling on the claim for injunctive relief. The complaint alleges
a manipulative scheme which is still continuing. While doubtless
the Commission could seek to halt such practices, present stockholders are also logical plaintiffs to play "an important role in
enforcement" of the Act .... 49
As a result of these inroads into the purchaser-seller limitation, the
demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine has been predicted by the commentators.5 0
Nevertheless, the doctrine, at least in principle, has been consistently reaffirmed by the courts: 51
Birnbaum has been shot at by expert marksmen. The buyer-seller
requirement for standing has been criticized as too strict a reading
of the rule. Commentators have said that [the] Birnbaum [rule]
has been significantly eroded.... Bloody but unbowed, Birnbaum

still stands ....52
The 'Supreme Court, in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life &

Casualty Co.,53 could have resolved the above conflict between the lower
courts and the writers. 54 In that case, the fraudulent scheme involved three
securities transactions-one involving government bonds, one involving
common stock, and one involving a certificate of deposit. The scheme was
to acquire Manhattan Corporation common stock with Manhattan's own
assets. Begole purchased all of Manhattan's stock from Bankers Life with
a check from Irving Trust, even though no funds were on deposit at that
time. Once in control, the Begole group sold the government bonds owned
by Manhattan for the purported purpose of acquiring a certificate of deposit
as a substitute investment. However, the proceeds from the sale of the
bonds were used to reimburse Irving Trust. In order to conceal this depletion of Manhattan's assets, Irving Trust issued another check to the
new president of Manhattan, a cohort of Begole. The president used this
check to purchase a certificate of deposit in Manhattan's name from Belgian
Trust. Then the certificate was used as collateral on a loan so that the
second check from Irving Trust could be paid off. Manhattan's records
only reflected the sale of the bonds and the purchase of the certificate of
deposit.

48. 884 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
49. Id. at 546-47: However, the Birnbaum Doctrine was reaffirmed as to
actions for damages.
50. Lowenfels, supra note 17.
51, See, e.g., Cooper v. Garza, 431 F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1970); Simmons v. Wolfson, 428 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1970); Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.)
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970); City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221
(8th Cir. 1970); Greenstein v. Paul, 400 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1968).
52. Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 877 (5th Cir. 1970).
53. 92 S. Ct. 165 (1971).
54. Boone &McGowan, supra note 41, at 649.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol37/iss3/4
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6
Both the district court 56 and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed that because of the sale of Manhattan's bonds, Manhattan had
standing to sue under the Birnbaum Doctrine. However, both courts also
held the company did not have standing on the other two transactions because it was neither a purchaser or seller. Even though plaintiff had
standing to sue on one of its theories, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the dismissal of the complaint because it determined the fraud
forcing the sales of the bonds (corporate mismanagement) was not cognizable under rule 10b-5. 57 Because the lower courts had already found that
Manhattan had standing on the treasury bond transaction, Mr. Justice
Douglas proceeded to the issue of the cognizability of the fraud. The Supreme Court held that corporate mismanagement was cognizable fraud
under rule 10b-5 when it touched a securities transaction. 58 The Court
passed up the opportunity to comment upon the question of the standing
of nonsellers under rule 10b-5, which was presented by the sale of Manhattan's common stock by Banker's Life:

Petitioner's complaint bases his single claim for recovery alternatively on three different transactions alleged to confer jurisdiction under § 10 (b): Manhattan's sale of the Treasury bonds; the
sale of Manhattan stock by Banker's Life to Bourne and Begole;
and the transactions involving the certificates of deposit. We only
hold that the alleged fraud is cognizable under § 10 (b) and Rule
10b-5 in the bond sale and we express no opinion as to Manhattan's standing under § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5 on other phases
of the complaint. 59
Because the Court expressed no opinion on standing in the other two
transactions, it would appear that the only transaction on which evidence
can be presented on remand is Manhattan's sale of the bonds. Query: was
the Court's failure to address theories involving the Birnbaum Doctrine an
implicit affirmation of that doctrine?
The Supreme Court is not alone in avoiding a direct determination of
the propriety of Birnbaum. On occasion, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has explicitly avoided such a determination by characterizing plaintiffs as purchasers or sellers, thus avoiding the issue of whether others
affected by the fraud have standing to sue under rule 10b-5.60 Also, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Rekant v. Desser,61 sidestepped the SEC's
contention (as amicus curiae) that purchasers, sellers and holders of sefailed to state a
curities have standing to sue, by holding the complaint
62
cause of action. The issue of standing was not reached.
55. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life &: Cas., 300 F. Supp. 1083, 1098
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 430 F.2d 355 (2d. Cir. 1970), rev'd, 92 S. Ct. 165 (1971).
56. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Gas. Co., 430 F.2d 355, 360-61
(2d Cir. 1970), rev'd, 92 S. Ct. 165 (1971).
57. Id.
58. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life &cGas. Co., 92 S. Ct. 165, 169 (1971).
59. Id. at 169 n.10, citing Kellogg, supra note 41; Lowenfels, The Demise of
The Birnbaum Doctrine:A New Era For Rule 10b-5, 54 VA. L. Rr.v. 268 (1968).
60. See A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967); Vine v.
Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
61. 425 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1970).
62. Id. at 879.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1972
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As can be seen from the cases discussed, the determination of standing
is unpredictable. Resolution of the issue depends upon judicial discretion
as to who is a "purchaser" or "seller," or perhaps a fortuitous sale or purchase of securities by the plaintiff. The obvious lack of analytical precision
in determining standing to sue under rule 10b-5 should be corrected.6 3
Logically, the place to begin is with a definition of standing, although
due deference must be given to Mr. Justice Douglas' admonition that
"[g]eneralizations about standing to sue are largely worthless as such." 64
Historically, the issue of standing has been encountered most frequently in cases involving administrative and constitutional law.65 Its
origin is article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution, which
limits federal court jurisdiction to "cases" and "controversies." 66 A resolution of the standing issue determines only "whether the dispute sought
to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and in a form
historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution." 67 Justice Brennan
has defined standing and its underlying policy this way:
"[T he gist of the question of standing" is whether the party seeking relief has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends
for illumination of difficult... questions." "In other words," we
said in Flast, "when standing is placed in issue in a case, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper
party to request an adjudication of a particular issue" and not

whether the controversy is otherwise justiciable, or whether, on
the merits, the plaintiff has a legally protected interest that the
defendant's action invaded. .

.

. The objectives of the Article

III standing requirement are simple: the avoidance of any use of
a "federal court as a forum [for the airing of] generalized grievances about the conduct of government," and the creation of a
judicial context in which "the questions will be framed with the
necessary specificity, ... the issues ... contested with the necessary
adverseness .... 68

Consequently, the focus is on the person invoking federal court jurisdiction in making the determination whether he is the appropriate person

to maintain the cause of action. 09 The merits of the case are irrelevant7 0
criteria which may be used to
and standing is but one of a number of 71
determine whether a case is nonjusticiable.
63. Kellogg, supra note 41.
64. Association of Data Proc. Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,

151 (1970).

65. Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 805 (5th. Cir. 1970).
66. Association of Data Proc. Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 151 (1970).
67. Id. at 151-52, citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968).
68. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 170-71 (1970) (citations omitted).
69. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968).
70. Association of Data Proc. Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 151 (1970). Previously, the Court had applied a "legal interest" test to determine standing; this test went to the merits, and was abolished on the ground that
the question of standing should not be based on the merits.
71. Echter, The Proper Parameters of Justiciability, 67 Tm Baiar 25 (1971).
The doctrines used by the courts are "rules of self restraint." Barrows v. Jackson,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol37/iss3/4
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The Supreme Court has developed two tests to determine when standing exist, 7 2 one constitutional and one non-constitutional. The constitutional test is this threshold question: Has "the plaintiff alleged that the
78
challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise?"
Once it has been determined that "injury in fact" has been alleged by
the plaintiff, the question becomes: "[Is] the interest sought to be protected by the complainant.., arguably within the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated by the statute ... in question?" 7 4 This non-constitutional test further limits those having standing to persons most immediately involved in the alleged wrong giving rise to the claim.7 5 Mr. Justices
Brennan and White concur in the minority position that the second test
is "wholly unnecessary and inappropriate."' 7 6
Herpich v. Wallace77 will be used as a vehicle to discuss the two tests
for determining standing to sue in the context of rule 10b-5. In this case,
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that the plaintiff's right
to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court under rule 10b-5 should be
determined by the "injury in fact" and the "zone of interests to be protected" tests. 78 The result was continued support for the Birnbaum rule.7 9
The facts were that Wilder had practical control of National American by virtue of his ownership of stock in National American and in a
company owning a majority of National American's stock. He sold his
stock in both companies to defendant's corporation for a premium (three
million dollars in excess of its fair market value). By a number of transfers between corporations controlled by the defendants, the stock came
to rest in Alabama National Life Insurance Co. National American was
to be merged into Alabama National. Through the merger National
American would receive at the premium price the stock sold by Wilder.
Consequently, National American would pay the premium out of its
own assets. Also, the complaint alleged the new controlling stockholders
were wasting corporate assets.
Before the merger was completed the minority shareholders in National American brought class and derivative actions, alleging a violation
of rule l0b-5. The class action was dismissed because the plaintiffs were
neither buyers or sellers in the securities transaction touched by the fraud. 80
However, because the corporation would have been a seller and a purchaser,
346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953). One of the problems with standing is that it has been
used as a "shorthand" expression for various elements of justiciability. Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968).
72. Association of Data Proc. Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
152-53 (1970).
73. Id. at 152.
74. Id. at 153 (emphasis added).
75. Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HAmv. L. R.av. 633, 637 (1971).
76. Association of Data Proc. Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
169 (1970). For a debate on the validity of the second test, compare Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Ci. L. REv. 450 (1970), with Jaffe, supra note 75.
77. 480 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970).
78. Id. at 805.
79. Id. at 810.
80. Id.
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the plaintiffs were allowed to bring the derivative action for damages and
8
to enjoin the merger. 1
It seems anomalous that the plaintiff had a sufficient personal stake
to bring the action on behalf of the corporation yet not for himself. In
both instances it would seem that the plaintiff was sufficiently aggrieved
to assure an adversary proceeding. This situation was brought about by
the court's misapplication of the two tests used to determine whether a
minority shareholder has standing. Instead of analyzing the two tests
separately, the court combined them and asked: Was the "injury of the
type that the Act seeks to prevent?" 8 2 As a result, the court focused its
attention on the injury rather than the plaintiff-shareholder's status.
The proper threshold question is: Did the plaintiff allege injury in
fact, economic or otherwise? Because of the defendant's sale of securities,
the corporation's assets were being wasted. Not only did this damage the
value of the corporation; it also diminished the value of an individual
plaintiff's stock. Moreover, the proposed merger was to be entered into
on terms disadvantageous not only to National American but to its shareholder as well. Thus, the complaint contained a colorable allegation of
personal injury.
Because the pleading contained an allegation of injury in fact, the
court should have proceeded to the non-constitutional test of standing
as to an individual plaintiff. Though the court did not directly consider
this second issue it did identify what it considered to be the zone of interest protected by rule 10b-5. In essence, the court said that the interest to
be protected is an unmanipulated market (or trading situation), so as to
afford investors a reasonable opportunity to make knowledgeable and
intelligent decisions regarding their security investments. 83 But the court
concluded that the only investors to be protected were purchasers and
sellers of securities. This overlooked the fact that investors may also be
induced by fraud not to buy or not to sell securities. Query: Should not
these nonsellers and nonpurchasers be protected from clandestine, fraudulent schemes which significantly affect the price of securities?
The court's decision supporting the Birnbaum Doctrine is not surprising. The cases cited in Herpich supporting the proposition that only purchasers and sellers have interests to be protected are, for the most part,
progeny of the Birnbaum Doctrine and Birnbaum itself.84
Instead, a reexamination of Birnbaum should have been undertaken
to determine who actually possesses the interests within the zone to be
protected by section 10 and rule 10b-5. As stated before, the Birnbaum
Doctrine rests on administrative history evidencing the SEC's intent in
promulgating 10b-5: to close the "loophole" in section 17 (a) of the 1933
Act by providing protection for defrauded sellers. 85 Professor Louis Loss,
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
BERG

Id. at 809-10.
Id. at 805.
Id. at 806.
Id.
SEC Securities Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942), (reprinted in BRoM-

App. B, at 295), reads as follows:

The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced the adoption
of a rule prohibiting fraud by any person in connection with the purchase
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol37/iss3/4
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although agreeing that the above interpretation is correct,8 6 points out
that the SEC did not exhaust its power under section 10 by the promulgation of rule 10b-5.87 Even though there is a "dearth of evidence" on this
point,8 8 the statute itself and its legislative history seem to bear out the
proposition that Congress intended to protect all investors-not just purchasers and sellers. The legislative history indicates several attempts to
narrow the broad language of section 10,89 but, as finally amended, it
gave the SEC the power to promulgate rules "necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors." 90 Thus, the SEC
has power to protect all investors, not just purchasers and sellers of securities.9 1 One commentator recently supported this proposition by noting:
Birnbaum'sreliance on legislative and administrative history to determine that only defrauded purchasers or sellers have private
remedies under 10b-5 appears misplaced. In the Supreme Court
decision of J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, the Court was confronted with
the question whether a cause of action was available to protect
private interests under the Exchange Act's proxy regulation
section, 14 (a). As with section 10 (b), there was no legislative history
to directly support a private cause of action under section 14 (a),
yet the Court . . .stressed the congressional purpose of the sec-

tion, determining that while the language of 14(a) "makes no
specific reference to a private right of action, among its chief
purposes is 'the protection of investors,' which certainly implies
the availability of judicial relief where necessary to achieve that
result." It was added that courts have a duty "to be alert to provide
such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional
purpose." Since section 10 (b), like 14 (a), was passed for the protection of investors . . . there are many situations in which an

investor may be injured. . . "in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security," before he actually sold or purchased such a
security, [and] it would appear to be within 92the congressional
purpose of 10 (b) to allow [such] ... a remedy.

Even though the Birnbaum Doctrine was based on the express administrative history that a loophole in section 17 (a) of the Securities Act of
of securities. The previously existing rules against fraud in the purchase of
securities applied only to brokers and dealers. The new rule doses a loophole in the protections against fraud administered by the Commission by
prohibiting individuals or companies from buying securities if they engage
in fraud in their purchase. The text of the Commission's action follows:
The Securities and Exchange Commission, deeming it necessary for
the exercise of the functions vested in it and necessary and appropriate

in the public interestand for the protection of investors so to do, pursuant

to authority conferred upon it by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
particularly Sections 10 (b) and 23 (a) thereof, hereby adopts the following Rule X-1OB-5.... (emphasis added).
For the text of the rule, see note 3 supra.
86. 6 L. Loss, SECURTIms REGuLATION 3617 (Supp. 2d ed. 1969).
87. Id. at 1469 n.8.
88. BROMBERG § 2.2 (331), at 22.2.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.

92. Clechon, The Decline of the Purchaser-SellerRequirement of Rule lOb-5,

14 VILL. L. REv. 499, 501 (1969) (citations omitted).
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1933 existed, this does not justify the use of the legal maxim expressio
unius est exclusio alterius in the interpretation of rule 19b-5. The rule is
much broader than the remarks in the release promulgating the rule indicated. Indeed, in the same release, the SEC emphasized that the rule was
adopted to protect "investors." 93 Rule 19b-5 is in substance a repetition of
section 10 (b) of the 1934 Act and 17 (a) of the 1933 Act, with one important exception-the substitution of "any person" for "any purchaser."
Had the Commission intended to limit the application of the rule to
sellers, so that only the loophole in section 17 (a) would be dosed, it would
have said "any seller" rather than "any person." Judge Hand in Birnbaum
merely glossed over the "any person" language, however, regarding rule
19b-5 as "loosely drawn" in comparison with section 17 (a), which refers
only to "purchasers." 94
A broad interpretation of rule 19b-5 is justified for at least two reasons. First, it is reasonable to assume that the Commission's exercise of
power was co-extensive with the congressional grant of power. The fact
that the SEC, as amicus curiae, has argued the Birnbaum interpretation is
too narrow certainly bears this out. Second, section 10 (b) (and therefore
rule 19b-5) is a remedial statute, and remedial statutes are traditionally
interpreted broadly.95
The foregoing discussion illustrates that every investor-not just purchasers and sellers-has interests section 10 and rule lOb-5 should protect
(i.e., freedom to make security investment decisions unaffected by fraud).
Granting the reasonableness of this argument, the second test of standing
is fulfilled, because all it requires is that the interest sought to be protected
be "arguably within the zone of interests of the statute." 98
This does not mean that the protection of rule 19b-5 is unlimited. The
clause "in connection with the purchase and sale of securities" indicates
that the "purchase" or "sale" of securities (as broadly defined by the
1934 Act) must occur to activate rule 19b-5 protection. Thus, either the
effectuation of the scheme of fraud must involve the purchase or sale of
securities, or there must be a purchase or sale by some investor. Once the
trigger has been pulled, any investor who is harmed would have standing
to sue. The "in connection with" clause would be a jurisdictional basis,
as is the "use of interstate instrumentalities" clause. 97 This result would
clearly avoid further inconsistencies in the case law98 and the creation of
fictions to allow recovery. 99
93. See SEc Securities Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942), quoted note 85
supra.
94. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 956 (1952).
95. Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 801 (5th Cir. 1970); cf. SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
96. For this type of analysis of the "zone of interest" test, see Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 164-65 (1970).
97. Ruder, Current Developments In the Federal Law of Corporate Fiduciary
Relations-Standing to Sue Under Rule lOb-5, 26 Bus. LAw. 1289, 1302-03 (1971).
98. Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. R -v.725, 834
(1956).
99. See Voege v. American Sumarata Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369 (D.
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In sum, standing under rule 10b-5 is an "amorphous" concept, as it
is in other areas of the law.10 0 This uncertainty is due to direct and
result-oriented judicial manipulation of the standing concept. The limitation of standing to buyers and sellers has been motivated by such factors
as the potentially broad scope of rule 10b-5 liability,101 curbing expansion
of federal corporate common law,102 lack of causation,'0 8 or speculative
damages.' 0 4 But standing is not the proper tool to correct such vices. 105
It is a constitutional doctrine for determining who is the proper party to
bring the suit to insure that an adversary proceeding will result. As elsewhere, the "alleged injury in fact" and "arguably within the zone of
interest" tests should be applied. In cases, for example, where damages
are too speculative or causation is not present, these defects should be
dispensed with procedurally as they would be in other areas of the law.
Nevertheless, the attenuated Birnbaum Doctrine still stands.
C. THomAs WESNER, JR.

Del. 1965). The authors of R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SEcurrms REGULATiON (2d
ed. 1968), in commenting on this case, said:
Judge Steel held that when the plaintiff purchased her stock in the market
in 1945 the corporation impliedly represented to her that if and when
it ever entered into a merger it would only do so on terms that were
"fair" to her; when it did enter into a merger in 1960 on terms which she
alleged were "unfair," this made the representation false and gave her a

cause of action under Rule lOb-5. One would have to go back at least several hundred years to find such a palpable creation of a fiction by a court
to seize jurisdiction not otherwise conferred upon it. Id. at 963.

100. Fast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968).
101. Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 804 (5th Cir. 1970), citing R
&H. MARSH, SEcuarns REGULATION 961 (2d ed. 1968).

JENNINGS

102. Leech, supra note 98, at 834. Compare Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development
of a Federal Law of Corporations by Implication Through Rule 10b-5, 59 Nw.
U.L. REv. 185 (1964), with Felischer, Federal Corporate Law, an Assessment, 78
HARv. L. REv. (1965). See also Bollman, Rule 10b-5: The Case of its Full Acceptance as Federal CorporateLaw, 37 Gin. L. REv. 727 (1968); Ruder, supra note 97,
at 1290-92; and Note, Federal Common Law, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1512 (1969) (discusses growth in other areas of the law).
103. BROMBERG § 8.8, at 221.

104. Id.

105. Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CI. L. R.v. 450, 468

(1970).
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